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It’s Like to Be a Thing by Ian
Bogost. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2012. Pp. 168.
$60 cloth, $19.95 paper.
Jet Plane: How It Works by David
Macaulay (with Sheila Keenan).
New York: David Macaulay
Studio, 2012. Pp. 32. $13.55
library binding, $3.99 paper.
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology
of Things by Jane Bennett.
Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2010. Pp. 200. $74.95 cloth,
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Aircraft fairing, High-lift device,
Vortex generator, Aft pressure bulkhead, Ballute, Monocoque, Fuselage,
Flight test instrumentation, Drogue
parachute, Empennage, NACA
cowling, Accessory drive, Flightdata acquisition unit, Wire strike
protection system, Duramold, Air
data boom, Skin, Arming plug,
Auxiliary power unit, Airframe,
M10 smoke tank, Air brake,
Longeron.
Airbus A319 STL → PHX →
LAS.
Well, don’t you look at me like life
don’t hold you anymore mystery.
—Modest Mouse, “History Sticks
to Your Feet” (2009)
The human experience of flight is
thoroughly objective, driven, as it
is, by the airplane as an object. But
airplanes are not simply objects
to which we, as subjects, attend.
Airplanes lay claim on us, get their
blades into us, and so modulate the
way we think about and engage
them. Broadly speaking, airplanes
take part in how we think and
talk about flight. They are objects
that mediate our relationship with
air, with gravity, and even with
our own bodies. But airplanes are
perhaps even more than this and
for things other than us. What Ian
Bogost argues with respect to computers is equally applicable here:
“[F]or [it] to operate at all for us first
requires a wealth of interactions
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to take place for itself” (10). Jane
Bennett resonates with Bogost in
her insistence that things “act as
quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies
of their own” (viii). Our critical
engagements with flight must be
about more than what Bennett calls
demystification, which “presumes
that at the heart of any event or
process lies a human agency” (xiv).
What approaches such as
Bogost’s and Bennett’s bring to critical air studies from their external
vantage point is an insistence that in
critically engaging flight we work
not only to reveal, expose, or unveil
the human in the cockpit, but also to
find even more objects that enable
both flight and our thinking of it.
As Christopher Schaberg writes of
what he calls “airport reading” in
The Textual Life of Airports, “[T]his
type of reading depends on the airport itself to have already emerged
as a primary text of sorts, a legible
space where there are . . . planes
roaring into the air . . . (among
many other informational signs,
auditory cues, and aestheticized
views).”1 To think about airplanes
is to already be with airplanes.
In this short essay, I review
Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology
(2012) and Bennett’s Vibrant
Matter (2010) alongside David
Macaulay’s Jet Plane (2012),
which is devoted to a child’s experience of airplanes. While composed for different audiences in
traditionally discrete contexts, all

three books do critical, speculative work in providing explicit
articulations and implicit performances of alternative ontologies
from which critical air studies
might benefit. Gathered around
Jet Plane, Vibrant Matter, and
Alien Phenomenology, we can get
a taste of a speculative critical air
studies: the philosophy of nondualist ontologies and the politics
of distributed, material assemblages. I begin with Bogost, move
to Bennett, and conclude with a
reading of Macaulay’s children’s
book, which productively, if
implicitly, performs the philosophies of Bogost and Bennett.
Asking about “what it’s like
to be a thing,” Bogost articulates
other ways of doing philosophy
while at the same time explicating
his own unique strain of speculative realism. Bogost places his
work in media studies and computer science in a line with objectoriented philosophers Graham
Harman and Levi Bryant and
sociologist-turned-all-thingsfor-all-people Bruno Latour.
Primary for Bogost is the argument that “all things equally exist,
yet they do not exist equally” (11,
his emphasis). This means simply
that differences between humans
and nonhumans are not ontological, but specific. For instance, our
human capacity for language does
not quantitatively set apart our
being from a toaster’s, but marks
a (rather important) q
ualitative
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 istinction in our mode of being.
d
The implications of this for philosophy (Bogost’s field of deployment) are far-reaching. Of
particular importance is Bogost’s
argument that philosophers must
walk the narrow path between
a realism that treats all matter as
inert (i.e., a billiard ball reality)
and an idealism that reduces all
matter to what humans have to
say about it (i.e., social constructionism). This troubling binary
stems from the ontological distinction between humans and nonhumans. Bogost’s alternative, strange
realism acknowledges both that
objects are more than we have to
say about them and that their reality is not something we can crack
open and fully comprehend; this
is neither idealism nor standard
realism.
Flying this narrow path, Bogost
proposes “[t]he act of wonder,”
which “invites a detachment from
ordinary logics, of which human
logics are but one example” (124).
Bogost means wonder in two
senses: (a) “awe or marvel” and (b)
“puzzlement or logical perplexity”
(121). To wonder is to be drawn
to objects, or what Bogost calls
units (23), precisely by their ability to exceed our grasp. The work
of wonder can take many forms,
including ontography, metaphorism,
and carpentry, the descriptions of
which account for the bulk of his
book. Ontography is the practice of
ratcheting up logical perplexity to
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reveal the operations and relationships of objects “without necessarily
offering clarification or description
of any kind” (38): “It shows how
much rather than how little exists
simultaneously” (59). Examples
of ontography include Latourian
litanies (38–40), visual ontographs
(45–50), exploded views such as
those found in instructional manuals and children’s books (50–52),
and ontographic machines such as
card games like In a Pickle (56–57).
Ontography exposes the strange
reality of all units by disrupting traditional human logics, which often
work to simplify accounts of units.
In a similar vein, metaphorism is
an attempt to understand nonhuman relations and operations that
avoids the frequent reductionism
of the scientific tradition. Whereas
science is an attempt “to define
the physical and causal relations
between objects” (62, emphasis
added), metaphorism operates by
speculative analogy. Rather than
making sense of how a bat relates
to its environment by breaking
down the components of its eye,
which would get us no closer to
seeing the world through them,
metaphorism would argue that
“the bat . . . operates like a submarine” (64). Bogost acknowledges
that metaphorism can quickly
become anthropomorphism in this
regard; however, in the risk there
is reward. Drawing on Bennett,
Bogost argues that the very strangeness of the metaphor attends to the
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difference between submarines
and bats. Bats are not reduced by
analogy but are actually made far
stranger. Metaphorism, in this way,
leads Bogost to carpentry, the practice of making things that do philosophical work. Carpentry, Bogost
writes, is “constructing artifacts
that illustrate the perspectives of
objects” (109). The sonar signals by
which bats navigate could, via carpentry, be morphed into something
akin to a heat map—wherein closer
obstacles show up red and distant
obstacles blue—that humans could
then move in response to. Bogost’s
carpentry, like his metaphorism,
resonates with the work of Bennett.
Moving through vibrant matter,
Bennett enacts both a philosophical and political project. Bennett,
who, like Bogost, works with
Latour, additionally pulls from the
work of Baruch Spinoza, Henri
Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari, especially the latters’ idea of assemblages. Bennett
(whose area of deployment is political theory) argues that our political
and philosophical work needs to
attend to the agency of assemblages
and the vibrancy of matter, which
she describes as “thing-power.”
Bennett explores the force of
things, or what she calls actants,
such as minerals (
chapter 4),
fatty acids (chapter 3), stem cells
(
chapter 6), worms (
chapter 7),
and electricity (chapter 2). In each
chapter, Bennett advances her philosophical project—by engaging

a series of thinkers who have
taken up stuff—and her political project—by engaging a specific piece of nonhuman stuff. For
example, she writes extensively on
the 2003 North American blackout. Understanding the blackout as
a vibrant assemblage requires that
we neither boil it down to human
motivations lurking beneath the
behavior of electricity (e.g., the
incompetence or greed of electric companies) nor pin it down
conclusively via a reductionist
realism (e.g., electricity has no volition). Bennett argues that we must
address “the cascade of effects”
that includes humans and nonhumans. As she remarks in an earlier
version of the chapter, “[e]lectricity too contributed swerves and
quirks.”2 Whereas Bogost’s project
is squarely philosophical, Bennett’s
project employs philosophy on the
way to politics. “What difference
would it make to the course of
energy policy,” Bennett prods us to
ask, “were electricity to be figured
not simply as a resource, commodity, or instrumentality but also and
more radically as an ‘actant’?” (viii).
The stakes of any ontology are
high: ignoring the thing-power
of electricity or fatty acids bears
on how we approach public problems such as energy and obesity.
Working as she does from Latour,
Bennett echoes him in calling “for
people to imagine other roles for
things besides that of carriers of
necessity, or ‘plastic’ vehicles for
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‘human ingenuity,’ or ‘a simple
white screen to support the differentiation of society’” (30–31).
The vitalism of her vital materialism sees that vitality as “the
capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not
only to impede or block the will
and designs of humans but also
to act as quasi agents or forces
with trajectories, propensities, or
tendencies of their own” (viii).
Bennett’s project asks us not to dig
deep past the facades of objects,
but to play with their surfaces to
get at just how matter (or assemblages of matter) exerts agency
and produces effects in the world.
Taking matter at face value, “[w]e
see how an animal, plant, mineral,
or artifact can sometimes catalyze
a public” (107). And there is more
than just philosophical recognition
at stake here: “[W]e might then
see how to devise more effective
(experimental) tactics for enhancing or weakening that public”
(107). At stake in the philosophical
recognition of matter as vibrant is
the political necessity of activating
such recognition. What a public
(as an assemblage) is is not only
human but nonhuman, as well.
Where Bogost raises the stakes
for philosophy by crafting ways of
engaging the nonhuman, Bennett
doubles down on these stakes
in attending to the political and
ethical implications of nondualist
ontologies: “I believe that encounters with lively matter can chasten
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my fantasies of human mastery,
highlight the common materiality of all that is, expose the wider
distribution of agency, and reshape
the self and its interests” (122). In
order to chasten such fantasies,
Bennett’s project, like Bogost’s,
calls for experimental tactics fueled
by naiveté and wonder.
The look and feel of the children’s book Jet Plane activates
precisely this wonder in and
engagement with airplanes as vital
objects important in their own
right (and not simply as means to
an end). Jet Plane (as an exemplar
of a rather robust genre) relates
a childlike view of the mechanics of flight that tends to leave us
as we grow older, when airplanes
become simply a mode of transport. I review this book not only
for how it speaks to children but
also for how it speaks to us as
scholars—as a work that engages
in thoughtful philosophical and
political work.
Jet Plane opens to the image of
a child gazing out at an airplane
approaching the terminal. We are
looking at the airplane through the
eyes of a child, and it is with these
eyes that we should linger over
airplanes. Bogost writes, “Our job
is to go where everyone has gone
before, but where few have bothered to linger” (34). But this lingering, to which Jet Plane is devoted,
is of a special quality, which Bogost
describes as wonder. The lingering of Jet Plane, then, isn’t mastery
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but a mixture of “awe or marvel”
and “puzzlement or logical perplexity” (121). This is the kind of
lingering I’m promoting for critical air studies, and it is the kind of
lingering we see performed in Jet
Plane. This illustrated reader was
written by David Macaulay (with
Sheila Keenan), who is famous for
his other books Castle (1982), City
(1983), Underground (1983), and
Mill (1989), which tell the stories of
each of these places through narrative and complex line drawings
often sketched from impossible,
nonhuman perspectives. These,
too, are books of wonder, which
fascinated me as a child and continue to fascinate my son and me.
Macaulay’s books are composed in
wonder in order to cultivate wonder—to marvel at how much the
world is full of and composed by
strange, nonhuman matter.
Jet Plane is likewise narrativebased. A child is moved through
networks of flight: from the
terminal, through the gate, past the
cockpit, into the cabin, away from
the terminal, down the tarmac, up
into the air, into the night, around
a storm, down through the clouds,
onto the runway, and back up to
the gate. At each step, the part of
the jet’s assemblage that makes
such movement and experience
possible is introduced: instruments
and screens, air traffic controllers, engines, fuel, lift, drag, thrust,
satellites, storms, landing gear,
and grounds crew. What you have

experienced is a function of these
(figure 1).
“A jet plane stands at the gate,”
Macaulay opens the book (4). The
jet plane is first an actant. This
grammar of object agency is present
throughout the book: “They [the
pilots] are surrounded by instruments and screens. These tell them
everything” (9). Bennett’s argument hinges upon the acknowledgment of this grammar: “[W]e are
much better admitting that nonhumanity infects culture, for the
latter entails the blasphemous idea
that nonhumans—trash, bacteria,
stem cells, food, metal, technologies, weather—are actant rather
than objects” (115). As the child
moves through the airplane, he is
surrounded not by simple, inert
objects, but actants that enable
flight (figure 2).
Jet Plane fosters an acknowledgment of object actancy, peering
into the world of flight on a child’s
behalf: cutaways, miniscule details,
exploded views. This work does
more than explain the airplane or
reduce it to component parts, but
rather exponentially increases the
airplane’s strangeness and its airplaneness. Airplanes are more puzzling when we linger over their
minutiae. Jet Plane aims not at
mastery or demystification but at
intimacy. We are suspended in air
by the slight curve of a wing. The
sheer awe and puzzlement with
which the child attends to the airplane opens up an entire world of
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Figure 1. Illustration from Jet Plane: How it Works. The wonder of a child as he lingers over
the airplane’s wing through the airplane’s window—a view itself already shaped by the airplane. From Jet Plane: How It Works © 2012 by David Macaulay. Reprinted by permission
of Roaring Brook Press. All rights reserved.

Figure 2. Illustration from Jet Plane: How it Works. A modified exploded view of an airplane
turning to avoid a storm. As Bogost himself writes of children’s books, “[A] child pores over the
cutaway view of a submarine . . . not to learn how to operate it but to fathom a small aspect
of its murky otherworldliness” (52). Note the dropped cup of coffee feeling the effects of the
turn. From Jet Plane: How it Works © 2012 by David Macaulay. Reprinted by permission of
Roaring Brook Press. All rights reserved.
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objects and things. Bogost describes
this kind of lingering as a job; for
children, lingering is not a job but
a pleasure-filled way of being in the
world.
The payoff here is simple. In
any critical engagement with
flight, with air, we must attune
ourselves to the vibrancy of airplanes. Airplanes must be more
than a means to an end and other
than signifiers, representations,
cultural artifacts, or containers for
human interaction. What a children’s book like Jet Plane does is
to engage the airplane with an eye
neither toward the reduction of
scientific certainty nor the reduction of cultural significance, but
with an eye toward wonder and
enchantment, which are surely
critical tasks, as well. Jet Plane
wants to suck us into and expose
us to airplanes in their strange
reality. In this book, airplanes are
things to linger on and with.
What I find additionally compelling about such a speculative
approach is the willful mixture of
closeness and distance. It is a realism born not of critical distance, the
usual way one obtains objectivity,
but born of a kind of puzzled proximity from which things can then
withdraw. Objectivity is an effect of
intimacy rather than its opposite.
The closer we get to airplanes, the
stranger they become as an object.
This strangeness, I’d wager, would
serve well any critical engagement

with flight. To inhabit an airplane
as a child is to attend to the airplane
as an active ingredient in the experience of air. It is the critical comportment of wonder and naiveté: to
believe that an airplane will never
fully divulge its secrets no matter
how long or intently we peer at
or through it or how ever long we
sit in it. Flight does not need to be
demystified.
Our understanding of flight
is predicated upon our being in
airplanes, which are not simply
a part of the experience of flight,
but a necessary condition for our
experience of flight as such. We
are attuned to the air by the airplane: when our ears pop, as we
chew gum, as we breathe the air,
as we taste the food, as turbulence
jostles the plane and our confidence in it, and as we take a cautious peak into the air-sickness
bag. We cannot abstract our experience of flight from our material relations with airplanes. Our
attitudes change with altitude.
Designed by humans to be sure,
but in response to any number of
forces, human and nonhuman,
airplanes are themselves an ongoing negotiation among humans,
gravity, rain, wind, clouds, electricity and fossil fuels: airplanes
are diplomats. They are objects
we both work with and are with.
Bennett and Bogost articulate this
explicitly; Macaulay performs it
implicitly.
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